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Abstract: This article’s support for the critical equity agenda can be found in
proposing that scholarship on equity could benefit from embracing a distinctive
“Law and History” approach. In doing so, it acknowledges that amongst “main-
stream” areas of law, equity has been the subject of very extensive historical
scrutiny, and suggests that further but differently focused historicization can
complement what is already exigent within conventional legal history alongside
critical legal history. In illuminating how “Law and History” might differ from
traditional and critical legal histories, the analysis explains how “Law and History”
embodies established approaches within both, but emphasises the work of histor-
ians to a much greater degree than either. In identifying its current hallmarks, it
explains that the parameters of “Law and History” are still being worked through.
It also suggests that this notwithstanding, setting out for lawyers how historians
perceive themselves and their work, and approach their craft – drawing this from
current and highly profiled debate within history itself – identifies the potential of
history as a resource of critique across legal scholarship. In identifying historians’
own perceptions of the importance of “mutual reinforcement” in social science
scholarship, the analysis also explains how law can become a much more exten-
sive resource of critique for history than is currently the case.
Keywords: law and history, legal history, Critical Legal Studies, equity, law and
society
This analysis is looking to respond to concerns amongst “critical equity”
scholars that hitherto Equity has not attracted the attention it properly
deserves within the critical legal field, and that it is poorly represented more
generally in legal scholarship. It is also looking to do so in ways which are
premised on the proposition that it is possible to identify “equities … each with
divergent histories, overlapping and intersecting – and perhaps passing one
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another by – in complex ways, but holding them together is a relation
to Law,”1 and which are congruent with the aims of the critical equity move-
ment in challenging scholarly approaches in which equity is not properly
represented and actually marginalised in “overall conclusions”2 drawn
about it and its relationship with law. However its own agenda is primarily
one of method and approach, in looking to draw attention to how the critical
equity movement could usefully engage with history in seeking to celebrate
equity “in all its multifariousness” and liberate it from a dominant discourse
where it is treated as being largely tangential.3 Here equity is thus not so much
the focus of this analysis, but instead a reference point for exploring how
legal scholarship more generally can benefit from greater engagement with
history and historical approach. Here attention is paid to how legal scholarship
currently engages methodologically with history, and how it might usefully
engage more with history, and perhaps how it might do so differently
from how is currently the case.
1 Background and context: the importance
of history for the critical equity agenda
A hallmark of the critical equity agenda is of course that there are many faces
of equity, if not actually different types of equity posited in equity’s “protean
nature,” where equity is also seen to relate to “important jurisprudential
questions concerning forms of judgment within and beyond law, and ethical
modes of conduct(ing) and relating to law.”4 It is also the case that in recog-
nizing this it is important to appreciate that analysis of equity as it is con-
ventionally understood – as “the law” which has emanated “from the English
Court of Chancery, and now inscribed within the architecture of modern
law and legal governance,”5 also rightly occupies critical equity scholars.
Here the analysis readily agrees with criticism that equity can be too readily
imprisoned within comparisons made and contrasts drawn between it and
1 Publicity from the University of Kent Equity & Trusts Research Network, 2015 https://www.
kent.ac.uk/law/research/centres-and-groups/equity/html
2 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network.
3 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network.
4 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network.
5 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network.
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law, notwithstanding that conventional analyses of equity do acknowledge its
performative qualities within the English (and wider common law) tradition,
both in how equity acts and operates in relation to the common law – through
providing support for legal rights alongside militating some of law’s purported
rigidity,6 and actually how it shapes law.7 This instant analysis aligns itself
with how the critical equity agenda importantly embodies the need for greater
scrutiny of how these characteristics of equity should be acknowledged and
treated conceptually.
In supporting scholarship which looks to establish equity as an important
focal point in its own right, rather than part of an amorphous mass of what
might be “bundled” together as “law”8 – and looking to analyse it not as “law’s
accomplice”9 but instead as being much more powerful in its own right, and
actually undertaking the function of “antagonist”10 – this analysis does recog-
nize conceptions of equity associated with fairness justice and creativity, and
also protection and stability. However it is first and foremost an advocacy for
what will be termed a “Law and History” approach. Here, in introducing lawyers
to “Law and History” thinking does recognize how legal scholars do currently
engage with “history of doctrine,”11 principally through reference to conven-
tional legal history and critical legal history alike. It also requires acknowl-
edging that within legal scholarship a great deal of attention has been paid to
“history of equity” specifically. But in suggesting that “Law and History” is
something which can be distinctly identified and distinguished from legal
history – both conventional and critical – attention is paid to why this might
be so, and to how lawyers might benefit from engaging with historical scholar-
ship more extensively, and especially with that relating methodologically to
society and broader social trends of continuity and change.
Many legal historians – conventional and critical – do engage with history
in order to comprehend the complexities underpinning relationships subsist-
ing between “law” and “society”; and indeed to “work out” whether
“the secret of that relationship” lies in regarding law as a dependent or
independent variable: “Is everything about law – norms, rules, processes,
6 See e. g. Sarah Wilson, Todd and Wilson’s Textbook on Trusts and Equity (Oxford: OUP, 2015),
where this text utilizes Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 in support of this proposition.
7 Wilson, Todd and Wilson’s Textbook on Trusts and Equity.
8 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network, 2015.
9 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network, 2015.
10 Publicity from the Equity & Trusts Research Network, 2015.
11 Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” Stanford Law Review 36 (1984): 57–125.
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and institutions – determined by society, or does law have ‘autonomous’
internal structures or logic?”12 What can be identified as “Law and History”13
is evolving to suggest that how the discipline of history itself configures
past alongside present in understandings of society and social change could
itself be a valuable resource of critique for legal scholarship. Drawing princi-
pally on the work of John Tosh and William H. Sewell Jr. as illustration of a
more extensive reflection from historians on their craft and overall approach,14
it will be suggested that this thinking not only has the potential to enhance a
broad spectrum of legal scholarship – critical and more traditional alike – but
that in the spirit of “mutual enforcement”15 advocated within this
current trend in historical thinking, that engaging with historians’ reflections
on the importance of history could also present an opportunity – and a rare
one perhaps – for lawyers to communicate the importance of law for histor-
ians’ analysis of society and social change. Here the analysis sets out key ideas
from historical scholarship which are integral to a nascent “Law and History”
approach, situating this alongside how legal history has engaged with history,
and how both legal scholarship and the discipline of history both recognize
that in being used, history can also be abused.16
Whilst this analysis’ interest in equity is more methodological than sub-
stantive, identifying how legal history within legal scholarship has always
provided a rich and fertile ground for analyses of equity as conventionally
understood by lawyers does serve to illustrate the potential value of a
“Law and History” approach for legal scholars. More is said directly about the
elements of “Law and History” shortly, but much can be said about its essence
also from considering contextually the hallmarks of conventional legal history
within legal scholarship. Here tradition of regarding equity as part of an
“amorphous mass” of law is evident in Sir John Baker’s classic work, presenting
the “equity of the Court of Chancery,” as being premised on the common law
12 Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” 58.
13 Working from ideas initially set out in Sarah Wilson The Origins of Modern Financial Crime:
Historical Foundations and Current Problems in Britain (Abingdon: Routledge (Criminology),
2014).
14 See also Richard John Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta Books, 1997, 2000),
which also contextualises the impetus for such reflections from historians on their craft, its
methods and its significance.
15 See William Hamilton Sewell Jr., Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformations
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 1.
16 Borrowing from the seminal Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life
(first published 1874; Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2010).
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being “immutable,” and where the “just remedy was provided not by changing
the law but by avoiding its effects in the special circumstances of particular
cases.”17 Although Baker continues through explaining how English law can be
seen to have been “changed” through permanent additions of equitable instru-
ments, doctrines, and remedies; continuing “childbearing”; and even through
“judicial discretion, without precedent” being fashioned into statute, Baker’s
views on equity present these developments as making “the regular law function
more effectively.”18
Such perceptions of equity are also evident in Michael Lobban’s illumina-
tion of pre-Judicature Acts attempts during the 1820s to replace established
“fictions” of law with a system of rules promoting usability and accessibility,
underpinned by belief in that “one uniform system of laws [to] regulate the
whole” in an aspirational commercial society, “instead of vainly seeking, by
equitable inference, to adapt […] crude and scanty institutions.”19 These per-
spectives – which in turn typify much of what is regarded as “legal history” in
the English legal tradition – have prompted critical equity scholars to critique
dominant views of equity, which are regarded as underlying equity’s signifi-
cance. However, in suggesting that embracing a “Law and History” approach to
legal scholarship might help to redress the shortcomings identified by critical
equity scholars, it must also be acknowledged that equity attracts, and arguably
always has attracted, a great deal of historical attention. This is evident in the
work of Baker and Lobban, and also in that of Ibbetson,20 as well as more “law
and society” focused works of legal history.21 It has also arguably permeated the
abundant literature written around Chancery and conscience.22 It has even
permeated legal study, where academic texts on equity have traditionally com-
menced with reference to history,23 in a way which is almost exceptionally
17 John Hamilton Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (London: Butterworths, 4th
ed., 2002), 202.
18 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 203-204.
19 Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford: Clarendon,
1991), 195.
20 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999).
21 E. g. William R. Cornish and Geoffrey de N. Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989).
22 E. g. Margaret Halliwell, Equity and Good Conscience in a Contemporary Context (London:
Old Bailey Press, 1997), and Timothy Haskett, “Conscience, Justice and Authority in the Late-
Medieval English Court of Chancery,” in Expectations of the Law in the Middle Ages, ed. Anthony
Musson (Ipswich: The Boydell Press, 2001), 159.
23 E. g. Jill E. Martin, Hanbury & Martin Modern Equity (London: Sweet & Maxwell, first
published 1935).
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amongst studies of law. Thus, in looking to make the case that the critical equity
agenda could benefit from equity’s further historicization, attention is paid to
giving history a different kind of emphasis within legal scholarship from that
which currently pertains to traditional scholarship and even critical legal
studies.
2 “Law and History” – countering perceptions
of too much [legal] history
In suggesting that equity scholars should engage further with history than is
currently the case, it has already been noted that the sphere of equity does
traditionally hold an interest in historical perspective to a much greater degree
than is found elsewhere in studies of main areas of law; namely those concep-
tualized as the foundations of legal knowledge and understanding. In this vein,
the study of equity might appear least to manifest views that engaging with
law’s own past is an essential pursuit, rather than one which is specialist, and
has come to be regarded as “antiquarian,” and is becoming marginalized as a
result of this.24 The perceived importance attached by legal history to studies of
law’s own past is premised on how in the common law tradition, the structure of
modern law is “heavily dependent on the legacy of the past,” with this ensuring
that making sense of law today requires us to understand its history if we are to
approach law reform with confidence.25 This confidence required for law reform
is itself built on the view that the very integrity of law is at risk without engaging
with its past: legal history is the study of legal change, and without this law can
easily become reduced to being “a body of randomly changing rules,” rather
than a cogent and rational system of rule-making and governance.26
Stressing that these views characterize the doctrinal tradition within legal
scholarship is important for identifying key dimensions of this analysis, and
how it could serve to increase legal scholars’ historical engagement with
equity through illuminating a “Law and History” prism. Any proposition
that equity requires greater historical scrutiny requires explaining what
might be missing from scholarship where equity has, as alluded to, been
24 Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, vi.
25 Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, v–vi.
26 John Hamilton Baker, “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished,” Cambridge
Law Journal 59.1 (2000): 62–84, 63.
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subject to a great deal of historical engagement. This includes of course great
works of legal history from F W Maitland, notably the Equity lectures27 and
his seminal thinking on the social importance of the trust,28 alongside works
of Baker and Lobban aforementioned, and also alongside more recent inter-
pretations of legal history placing greater emphasis on interactions between
law and society whilst actually remaining very faithful to the conventional
legal history tradition of emphasizing the importance of law’s own history.29
Here Maitland’s work remains very significant for exploring the potential of a
“Law and History” approach for continuing critical engagement with equity
found within English law to ensure its contributions are properly conceptua-
lized and understood. Here Maitland’s overall approach, exemplified in his
work on equity, helps to draw out intellectual commonalities across law and
history underpinning what is now being termed “Law and History.” Indeed
this analysis presents more extensive integration of the “pursuit of history”30
into studies of law as a worthwhile pursuit, focusing on the essence of “Law
and History” and inviting further endeavor considering its applications for
the pursuit of critical equity.
3 The many faces of legal history – finding
a place and meaning for “Law and History”
Legal history as it is conventionally understood occupies a broad spectrum.
It embraces purist and more contextual approaches; whilst the latter will regard
“external sources” such as Parliamentary Debate and “official” enquiries etc. as
part of an analytical toolbox, the former will insist on analysing only “the law”
itself. It can be “top down,” by being focused on the narratives provided by
judges and legislators and the wider legal community, or “bottom up,” in
27 Frederic W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, ed. Alfred H. Chaytor (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1909).
28 E. g. Frederic W. Maitland, “The Corporation Sole,” in Maitland: State, Trust, Corporation,
ed. David Runciman (Cambridge: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, 2003),
and also Adam Gearey, “‘We Want to Live’: Metaphor and Ethical Life in F.W. Maitland’s
Jurisprudence of the Trust,” Journal of Law and Society 43 (2016): 105–22.
29 E. g. Cornish and de N. Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950.
30 Per John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of
Modern History (London: Longman, 5th ed., 2010).
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regarding ordinary people as agents of legal change. What unites conventional
legal history – which is regarded as history for the purposes of distinguishing it
from law as is31– in this vein is its regard for law’s own internal coherence, as a
system with its own rationale and logic, and thus free from outside influences.
In this regard, criticisms of conventional legal history are microcosmic for more
general critiques of the doctrinal tradition from within legal scholarship itself,
pursued notably through Contextualism, Critical Legal Studies and also Socio-
Legal Studies. And from this, a veritable tradition for “Critical Legal Histories”
has emerged. Given that its pioneers rightly observe that “Critical legal writers
pay a lot of attention to history,” and indeed “have probably devoted more
pages to historical description … than to anything else,” clarifying what is novel
about asking lawyers to engage more extensively with history through “Law and
History” is essential.
More is said about the essence of “Law and History” shortly, but much
about it can also be ascertained from what critical legal history has accom-
plished through exposing the characteristically conservative use of history by
legal scholarship, and the sharp scholarly divisions drawn between “law and
society” characterizing legal scholarship which it seeks to redress.32 Indeed,
both Peter Goodrich33 and more recently Stephen Waddams34 reference equity
very specifically in showing how lawyers can use history in a more extensive
and less conservative way, with these works alongside equally insightful more
generally focused contributions from David Sugarman35 showing how much
emphasis there is of history within legal scholarship rather than how little.
However these illustrations together with a core idea of writing a critical “history
of doctrine”36 can also be directed towards how the objectives of critical legal
history could be served by lawyers also engaging with current movements within
history itself. Here it is suggested that key methodological writings from within
history pointing to the benefits for “the present” of engaging with “the past,”
emphasizing society’s organic qualities of self-understanding and development
31 Baker, “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished,” 64.
32 See generally Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories.”
33 Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences
(London: Routledge (Politics of Language), 1996).
34 Stephen Waddams, “Equity in English Contract Law: The Impact of the Judicature Acts
(1873-75),” Journal of Legal History 33.2 (2012): 185–208.
35 David Sugarman, “Theory and Practice in Law and History: A Prologue to the Study of the
Relationship between Law and Economy from a Socio-Historical Perspective,” in Legal Theory and
Legal History, eds. Maksymilian Del Mar and Michael Lobban (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 443.
36 Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” 57.
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would appear to be highly congruent with critical legal scholarship’s regard for
“Law as a living thing.”37
In this regard, a “Law and History” approach can be seen as part of the critical
legal movement’s embrace of history, in how the former looks to expose scholars
to how historians configure history’s importance for society. Critical legal scholars
have arguably been encouraging lawyers to think as historians, evident for
example in the regard within this tradition for the work of FW Maitland. What
can be added to this is a more explicit recognition of how current writings within
history capture how historians see themselves as contributors to understandings
of society as a “living thing.”38 What is interesting here is how Maitland is
regarded within the doctrinal tradition alongside within the critical tradition
which celebrates his work on the “art of writing history.”39 Within the doctrinal
tradition, Maitland’s regard for “social and intellectual history” ideas is noted as
an approach which stands out in contrast to much legal history scholarship.
This is attributed within it to Maitland approaching legal history “as an historian,”
by virtue of finding a body of evidence relating to a particular matter or period of
time, and then to interpret this according to the social and intellectual settings in
which the documentation arose.40 Baker’s explanation of Maitland’s call for the
separation of “two logics” in the study of law – namely the logic of authority (as
used by practising lawyers) and the logic of evidence (as characterising the work
of historians)41 – does take us closer to ascertaining what might be meant by “Law
and History” in a number of ways.
4 Lawyers, legal scholarship and the essence
of “Law and History”
Identifying Maitland’s work with that of an historian helps to signpost the
significance attached to history by “Law and History,” and to explain the
necessity of drawing on historians’ work when there is evidence of legal
historians themselves working “as historians.” An important clue for this lies
37 Gearey, “‘We Want to Live,’” 110.
38 Gearey, “‘We Want to Live,’” in the spirit of what is posited about law, precisely on account
of how Gearey envisions law.
39 Gearey, “‘We Want to Live,’” 122, emphasis added.
40 Baker, “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished,” 64.
41 Baker, “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished,” 64.
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in the view that “the history of English law must also be an essential dimen-
sion in the social and intellectual history of this country,”42 helping to illumi-
nate how whilst Maitland did work in many ways as an historian, his pursuit
lay strongly in deepening understanding of law.43 “Law and History” like
critical legal history does regard the history of English law as an essential
dimension for the social and intellectual history of Britain. Its key contribution
to intellectual debate rests on emphasizing the value of current writings
from within history itself for illuminating the nuances of society and social
change for legal audiences; and also for enhancing historians’ own apprecia-
tion of law which is characteristically under-represented in even seminal
writings of history.44 These writings from within history are thus important
markers for what legal scholarship could gain from engaging with historians
and their approaches across a broad spectrum of legal research interests,
and for how in doing so, the spirit of “mutual reinforcement” can enable
lawyers to emphasize far more the value of legal research as a resource of
critique for history.
There is much more which law can do to stress to historians both the
reliance which historical research places on sources which are underpinned by
law and legal processes, and also the commonalities between how both dis-
ciplines approach scholarly endeavour. The latter is considered shortly, with
attention firstly paid to what it might actually mean for lawyers to work
“as historians.” Illuminating what this might mean for and indeed to historians,
starts with how for Tosh, the term “history” has two meanings – with these
attached both to what actually happened in the past and to the representation of
that past in the work of historians.45 This is where agreement amongst historians
ends, in ways which will be instantly recognisable amongst lawyers: “Anyone
who imagines that an introduction to the study of history will expose a
consensus of expert opinion needs to be promptly disabused.”46 One area of
contention within a discipline characterised by “heated arguments concerning
the objectives and limitations of historical study,”47 provides the next step in
understanding what might be meant by “Law and History.”
42 Baker, “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished,” 64.
43 This is certainly a very plausible reading of Baker’s retrospective as well as of Maitland’s
own work, but see also an altogether more imaginative and multi-faceted offering of Maitland’s
work in Gearey, “‘We Want to Live.’”
44 E. g. Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (London:
Routledge, 1990).
45 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, viii.
46 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, ix.
47 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, ix.
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This flows from Tosh noting that whilst some historians remain committed
to “discovering what happened in the past and what it was like to live in the
past” as an end in itself, others are increasingly regarding this as a starting
point for illuminating the present,48 through having regard for “historical
awareness.”49 In turn, Tosh sets out his understanding of “historical aware-
ness” and its capacity for helping societies better understand themselves from
what their evolutionary journey hitherto might reveal about their likely and
aspirational future directions – and ultimately as “living things.” From this,
“Law and History” would then suggest that the dynamics of social and legal
change can reveal a great deal about legal stasis and legal change, and the
importance of law as an instrument of societal governance which both reflects
societal stasis and change and also effects this. For Tosh, whilst “historical
awareness” is a slippery term,50 it helps to explain why human beings should
value history so greatly, and where our historical awareness – which can be
regarded as a “universal psychological attribute” – arises from positing that all
of us are, in a sense, historians:
Because our species depends more on experience than on instinct, life cannot be lived
without the consciousness of a personal past … As individuals we draw on our experience
in all sorts of different ways – as a means of affirming our identity, as a clue to our
potential, as the basis for our impression of others, and as some indication of the
possibilities that lie ahead. Our memories serve as both a data bank and as a means of
making sense of an unfolding life story. We know that we cannot understand a situation
without some perception of where it fits into a continuing process or whether it has
happened before. The same holds true of our lives as social beings. All societies have a
collective memory, a storehouse of experience which is drawn on for a sense of identity
and a sense of direction.51
From this, Tosh considers history the most important cultural resource for
society, with this applying particularly in situations which are unfamiliar or
alien to us, and in times of challenge.52 This is so by offering an indispensable
albeit imperfect sense of “the heights to which human beings can attain, and
the depths to which they may sink, the resourcefulness they may show in a
crisis, the sensitivity they can show in responding to each other’s needs.”53
48 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 1.
49 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, Chapter 1, 1–12.
50 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 1.
51 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 1–2.
52 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33.
53 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33.
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Through history we can draw on the experiences of societies from the past
without actually experiencing them ourselves, and thereby have access to a
resource of societal critique which is not within the purview of our own
experiences. Through “nourishment” provided from what has been “thought
and done in the very different contexts of the past,”54 rather than through
purporting to provide a “blue print” or precedent for responding to situations
which are perplexing, or for reinforcing optimism, history reminds us that
there are usually multiple ways for “interpreting a predicament or responding
to a situation.”55 In critiquing “meta history” which suggests that “history tells
us most of what we need to know about the future,”56 Tosh’s vision of enrich-
ment through history is one of a self-discovery and understanding which
alerts us to possibilities, and even potentially empowerment through “choices
[being] open to us are often more varied than we might have supposed.”57
Tosh’s message is that it is possible to configure even very anxious times
with hope and optimism, through regarding history as an “inventory of
alternatives,”58 from which a sense of what is possible arises through being
mindful not simply of the present we find ourselves in.
5 Law and society: uncovering the “secret
of that relationship”
The opportunities for societies to learn about themselves and to achieve greater
self-awareness can also be seen expressed more as an imperative in the work of
William Sewell Jr. Here Sewell both professes the expertise historians have in the
sphere of “the temporalities” of social life and social change through their
“complex and many-sided understanding” of this,59and shows exasperation
that this has “scarcely found its way into social theoretical debate” in social
science.60 Moreover, Sewell’s suggestion that bridging this disciplinary divide
through dialogue between history and social science is likely to be “mutually
enlightening”61 on account of what historians and social scientists can offer one
54 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33.
55 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33.
56 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 30.
57 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33–34.
58 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33–34.
59 Sewell Jr., Logics of History, 1.
60 Sewell Jr., Logics of History, 1; see also 6–14.
61 Sewell Jr., Logics of History, 1.
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another, is highly salient for what “Law and History” suggests is significant
about law for understanding society and social change. The importance of
recognising the interconnectedness of law and society through “Law and
History” analysis can now be explored through considering how lawyers might
approach law using history as a resource of understanding and critique. “Law
and History” highlights the similarities which appear to pertain in ways in which
lawyers and historians work alongside bright line distinctions which could be
drawn between “working as a lawyer” and “working as an historian” within
legal history itself.
As conventional legal history itself notes, whilst this is a term of potentially
wide import, a lawyer’s interest in legal history is commonly attached to the
“history of legal categories, concepts and doctrines; the mechanisms used by
lawyers to organize their thoughts.”62 A characteristic focus of illuminating law
itself, even when this is contextualised by social, economic and intellectual
“interest,” is perhaps the clearest difference between “working as a lawyer”
and “working as an historian” but one of many similarities between historians
and lawyers engaging with legal history is that both work across extended
timeframes. There are also more generally cast similarities between legal scho-
larship and historical endeavour flowing from how both involve engaging with
what social science would term “research questions,” whether or not this is
undertaken explicitly, and then with primary and secondary sources in the light
of this. Both lawyers and historians will identify and locate primary sources
which are believed to support ideas they wish to explore, and will examine and
seek to interpret these assisted by an intellectual “tool box” derived from a
combination of ideological preference with formal education, and where gui-
dance and support for primary source interpretation and for developing proposi-
tions and methodology is also sought from secondary sources. This occurs
within an intellectual setting which gives validity and freedom to ideological
preference through learning and understanding clustering around what might
be termed irreducible rules of engagement.
For lawyers undertaking analyses of the English and wider British legal
systems and traditions, these rules of engagement cluster around the doctrine
of judicial precedent, the hierarchy of the court system, and the rules of statu-
tory interpretation. This is also regarded as requiring understanding of interac-
tions between law and equity, and whilst “critical equity” is actively challenging
what has traditionally been concluded about this, stating this here simply points
62 Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, v.
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to the broadest parameters for undertaking what the legal academy would
recognise as “good scholarship.” In turn, irreducible rules of engagement for
historians relevant for lawyers looking to enrich legal analysis through utilising
history, and situating the past alongside the present, are embodied in three
central principles of historical enquiry. Principles of historical context and
historical process illuminate ways in which events of the past can be “read” in
current times, and initially their ability to be meaningful is premised against the
complimentary one of historical difference. Historical difference embodies the
regard which must be had to this is regard for how working with long time-
frames makes it inevitable that a period of time will separate our current
existence from our ancestors. Here those who work with long timeframes are
responsible for recognising that the passage of time has profoundly altered ways
of life, and to take account of these.63
Respecting this autonomy of the past means taking account of differences in
behaviour and outlook which have become formed over time, and where this
can be seen manifested not only in considerably altered broader trends of
society and economy, but also different value and belief systems (and differ-
ences in the ways in which these became translated into different priorities,
fears and hopes) across time as well as at different points in time.64 The regard
for differences which will inevitably subsist even in situations which might
appear to be very similar promoted through historical difference is continued
through what is termed historical context. Having regard to historical context is
the way in which the past and its strangeness (from our own time and place, as
promoted by reference to historical difference) is placed in its own historical
setting, so as to be interpreted as a manifestation of the period of study
concerned. Here, single particular events can be positioned alongside wider
beliefs and understandings about the past social and economic “state” of
being to understand how it might be viewed as a manifestation of the fears
and concerns, and hopes and ideals of the society concerned, and of course its
envisioned future. What underlies the justification for historical context is the
belief that in all historical work, events and occurrences which are the subject of
enquiry must not be wrenched from their proper setting, and must be under-
stood as experiences of the time: they must not be imbued with current mind-set
and value systems before being understood on their own terms.65
63 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 33–36.
64 Tosh, The Pursuit of History.
65 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 36–38.
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The principles of historical difference and historical context allow us both
respectively to uncover the strangeness of the past (respecting its separation in
time and character from any point ante and post-dating it) and explain it by
placing it in its “historical setting.” Historical process is concerned with mak-
ing use and application of the past, by acknowledging the continuing nature of
broad societal processes (human, economic and political alike). It relates to
points in time as part of a trajectory which is still unfolding, and one which
can even help to explain current states of play. Indeed, subject to having
regard for historical difference and context, situating events in such a way
can, according to Tosh promote “purchase on the future and allows a measure
of forward planning.”66 In other words, historical process posits that lessons
can be learned from the past, and applied to current issues and concerns.
In showing what is possible through the articulation of historical process Tosh
provides lawyers with a new prism through which to see law and its impor-
tance for society, in terms of being an agent of effecting social change, and
also actually driving social change. This in turn provides a very exciting
dimension for the pursuit of law reform which is effective by virtue of being
confident, and where this confidence comes from “knowing ourselves” as well
as we can, through appreciation of our resourcefulness and creativity – and of
the society which we are part of as a “living thing.” This might have significant
value as the earliest years of the twenty-first century are already forecasting a
future of uncertainty in a context of rapid and not entirely welcome “change.”
But it is also the case that even focusing on the emergence of modern Britain
from c 1750 to the present – as favoured by many conventional and critical
legal historians, and acknowledged by historians as being “radically different”
from previous times67 – manifest differences from today become readily appar-
ent, with this raising questions of what significance should be attached to
similarities which might also be found.68
6 Concluding thoughts
The perceived importance of history as a cultural resource for society is a basic
viewpoint which is shared by critical legal historians and historians alike.
66 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 40–42.
67 JeremyBlack andDonaldMacRaild,Nineteenth-Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), xvii.
68 See e. g. Wilson, The Origins of Modern Financial Crime.
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From this, writings from within history itself illustrate how both would acknowl-
edge the importance of making the case for regarding the past as actually
relevant for the present and not simply regarding it as being interesting as we
work through it and look to the future. In setting out the parameters, Tosh
explains that doubts as to history’s significance are manifested in two broad
ways. There are firstly ones founded on absolutism/essentialism, by virtue of
viewing events which shape societies and inform their particular dispositions
and characteristics as matters of accident, blunder and contingency, rather than
being part of a pattern with meaning.69 There are also objections channelled
through views that paying attention to the past is inconsistent with modernity,
with such views acknowledging that the past may well be useful in the face of
current challenges, but insisting that understanding and responding to current
conditions and future possibilities requires an approach reflecting “newness” in
societal conditions, and which is progressive and forward looking.70 Here reflec-
tions on the relevance of the past and concerns about attaching significance to it
for ascertaining the “secret” of relationships between the legal and the social
can be seen as clearly as ideas of “multiple trajectories” in writings of historical
method and critical legal history.71
Given that one of critical legal history’s most seminal writings laments the
little hope it has for making “a new contribution to the longstanding debates of
theory and method” in (socio-) legal history,72 one might question the value of
even developing the nascent “Law and History” discourse for legal scholarship.
However, “Law and History” is seeking a distinctive aim in looking to encourage
legal scholars to engage with historians’ work on the value of history for today.
Moreover, there are several indices for why this might be regarded as an
important pursuit, and one for this moment in time. Indeed, recent appraisal
of Gordon’s contribution to “‘critical legal history’ – or, to be completely accu-
rate, 'critical legal historiography’” venerates its importance and lasting con-
tributions for setting parameters for legal scholarship’s engagement with “law
and the social,”73 whilst several factors also point to why legal scholars should
69 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 30–32.
70 Tosh, The Pursuit of History.
71 See Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” especially 109–16.
72 Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” 57.
73 Christopher Tomlins, “What Is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique?
Revisiting Gordon’s ‘Critical Legal Histories,’” Law & Social Enquiry 37.1 (2012): 155–66; see
especially 158, engaging with Gordon’s commentary on how CLS blurs distinctions between law
and society.
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continue to explore the dynamics of the “law and society” relationship as
envisioned by Gordon, and should do so with optimism, and where “Law and
History” might assist in this pursuit.
The view that the “law and society” field has become more “law-centric”74
than it once was make this an excellent time for lawyers to give greater
visibility to valuable contributions which historians can make to social science
scholarship. Whatever the perceptions amongst lawyers on how much atten-
tion critical legal studies has paid to history, historians perceive their absence
from social science debate, with this signalling an opportunity for legal scho-
larship more generally to embrace historians’ expertise in the “temporalities”
of social life.75 Any current trend towards increasing “legal-centricity” of legal
scholarship is occurring in a wider intellectual setting which is encouraging
engagement with other disciplines and increasingly non-academic perspec-
tives, evident in attention being paid to interdisciplinarity and the importance
of impact in the production of academic research respectively within the UK
academy and in wider Higher Education policy, and which might alone suffi-
ciently concretize the importance for legal scholarship to embrace history.
However, the timeliness of legal scholarship’s embracing of history in ways
being encouraged by “Law and History” can also be demonstrated most
saliently in how the current context of regulatory reform manifests very visibly
Toshean “historical awareness” – albeit unacknowledged as such – in
reactions of UK regulators to the global financial crisis and their assessment
of responses required in its aftermath.
This is evident in earliest reactions to the arrival of the global financial crisis
in Britain in September 2007,76 and in responses from the much-criticised and
now defunct Financial Services Authority, and highly profiled speeches from
then Deputy Governors Andy Haldane and Paul Tucker during 2009,77 all
predating then incumbent Bank of England Governor Sir Mervyn King’s now
seminal lament on the importance of “lessons from history.”78 Thus whilst
these parameters are not “new” as such for legal scholars, this current interest
in history on the part of regulators spearheading legal and wider regulatory
reform adds impetus to the importance of history for analyses of law in its
74 Tomlins, “What is Left of the Law,” 157.
75 Sewell Jr., Logics of History, 1.
76 House of Commons Treasury Committee Report on Northern Rock: The run on the Rock, HC
2007-8, 56-1.
77 As considered extensively in Wilson, The Origins of Modern Financial Crime.
78 Sir Mervyn King, BBC Radio 4 Today Lecture 2012 (2 May 2012).
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historical, current, and aspirational states. This current context complements
how conventional legal history and critical legal history alike have long prof-
fered the benefits for sophisticated analyses of law to look beyond its present
state. To this extent, the aims of “Law and History” are part of a continuum
rather than seeking a radical departure. And whilst much of its import and
direction can be brought within the rubric of critical legal history, the emphasis
placed by it upon the importance of historians’ work and self-perception as
contributors to social science scholarship does perhaps justify the distinctive
“label” currently given to it. The same might also be said of how engaging with
history in such a direct and explicit way does create the opportunity for lawyers
to remind historians of how much the “art of writing history”79 undertaken by
historians owes to law and legal processes.
Sarah Wilson
Sarah Wilson is a Senior Lecturer in Law at York Law School, University of York in the UK. After
qualifying initially in Law at Cardiff Law School she commenced studies in Modern British
History gaining a MA (History) and PhD (History) before taking up a number of posts in UK Law
Schools. Her key research interests lie in Trusts and Equity, Financial Law, and a “Law and
History” combination of traditional Legal History and Modern British History. In the sphere of
Trusts and Equity, Sarah is an enthusiastic member of the Equity and Trusts Research Network.
In June 2015 she presented at the Network’s Equity and the Resources of Critique workshop at
the University of Kent, and then on “New Horizons in Equity” at Complicities: Law, Literature
and the Humanities Association of Australasia Conference 2015, University of Technology
Sydney, December 2015. She is also the longstanding author of Todd and Wilson’s Textbook
on Trusts and Equity (Oxford, Oxford University Press) with its 11th edition published in April
2015, and where Sarah’s approach is to promote “mainstreaming” of interdisciplinary and
critical perspectives.
79 Gearey, “‘We Want to Live,’” 122.
40 Sarah Wilson
